MINIMUM CONTACTS CONFUSED AND
RECONFUSED-VARIATIONS ON A THEME
BY INTERNATIONAL SHOE-OR, IS THIS
TRIP NECESSARY?
I.

THE CASE

In March, 1967, a boiler exploded in General Electric's
Ontario, California plant, injuring a worker. An inspection of the
ruptured boiler revealed a name plate with the legend, "The
Buckeye Boiler Co., Dayton, Ohio. Built 1960. .. ." For a
variety of reasons' in addition to the obvious convenience, the
injured worker sought to recover his damages in a California
court. The facts, however, on which he based his allegation of
jurisdiction were tenuous and incomplete.
Buckeye was an Ohio corporation, with its principal place of
business in Dayton. As the court notes, it had "no agent, office,
sales representative, exclusive agency, or exclusive sales outlet,
warehouse, stock of merchandise, property, or bank account in
California. ' 2 Although it did solicit sales in eighteen states,
California was not one of those states
In fact, Buckeye's only clear business contact with California
was through a series of sales to Cochin Manufacturing Co., also
an Ohio corporation, which maintained a plant in San Francisco.
Of these sales to Cochin, some orders came directly from, and the
merchandise was shipped directly to the San Francisco plant.
However, the cause of action did not arise from any of these
transactions. There was evidence (apparently uncontested) before
the court that, because of specification differences, the tank which
exploded at G.E. could not have been one of those sold to Cochin.
1. Plaintiff claimed that while in the hospital for the explosion injuries, he suffered a
fall, after which he was stricken with paralysis of his left side. He joined his doctor and
hospital, alleging that the fall was proximately caused by their negligence. He was
uncertain whether the paralysis was a result of the fall or the explosion. The medical
defendants allegedly cannot be sued anywhere but in California. Clearly plaintiff hopes to
avoid a multiplicity of suits, carrying the unhappy possibility of each defendant avoiding
liability by pointing the finger at the other.
2. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. 933, 937, 458 P.2d 57, 61, 80
Cal. Rptr. 11"3, 117 (1969).
3. As a matter of fact, California is not even geographically close to the eighteen
eastern and southern states which are solicited by Buckeye. The solicitations never reached
further west than Michigan.
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The evidence of how Buckeye's boiler did, in fact, wind up
in G.E.'s plant made plaintiff's prospects for jurisdiction even

dimmer. Aside from sheer conjecture, neither Buckeye nor G.E.
could account for it. Buckeye alleged that it sold no tanks to G.E.

or anyone else in California other than Cochin. G.E. not only had
no record of the purchase from Buckeye, but testified that its
policy was to avoid out-of-state purchases whenever possible

Both, however, admitted that they had no business records prior
to 1962.
'. Buckeye's motion to quash service of summons was denied,
and it petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of

mandate. The problem facing the court was redetermination of the
scope of California's personal jurisdiction statute,5 which allowed

the exer.ise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations who are
"doing business" within the state. In as much as this section has
long been interpreted to invoke the full power granted by the due
process clause,6 the real issue became the constitutional limitation
of "due process." Contiolling cases of the United States Supreme

Court 7 express the opinion that the requirement for exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is the existence
of "certain minimum contacts. . . such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.' "8
Having -determined that Buckeye was in no fashion

"present" within the state, 9 the court examined its current, three

step test for exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
Based upon United States, and California Supreme Court

decisions, the California courts have generally required (1) that
4. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. at 938, 458 P.2d at 61, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 117.
5. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411(2) (West 1954) repealed by CAL. GEN. LAwVS ANN.
ch. 1610 § 12 (Deering 1969).
6. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr.
1(1959); Henry R: Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
7. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); I-P.:.on v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
8. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316, partially quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) to the effect that traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice are implicit in the due process clause. Milliken, in turn was drawing on
Justice Holmes' opinion in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917), which spoke of the
exercise of jurisdiction being limited by common law "natural justice" and the 14th
amendment's implied requirement of "'fair play."
9. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. at 938-39, 458 P.2d at 62, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 118.
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there be purposeful activity within the forum whereby the
defendant avails himself of the benefits and protections of the
forum, 0 (2) that the cause of action arise from that activity," and
(3) that upon balancing the interest of the state in providing its
residents with a forum, against the potential inconvenience to the
out-of-state defendant, it be fair to maintain suit locally. 2
In determining whether there is the requisite "purposeful
activity," the practice has been to apply a "mechanical checklist"
of the outward manifestations of business activity t 3 This
approach has focused on such indicia of corporate activity as:
offices, agents, property, employees, jobbers, distributors,
manufacturer's agents or representatives in the state, and local
solicitation or advertising.
When compared with this checklist of local contacts,
Buckeye's meager contacts with California did not look much like
the required purposeful activity. The court was dissatisfied with
that result. Unceremoniously, it rejected the checklist approach in
favor of a new test designed to focus on the economic reality of
business transactions. Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice
Peters stated that the purposeful activity requirement will be met
where the defendant has engaged in "economic activity within the
state as 'a matter of commercial actuality.' "14 Apparently fearful
that this was not precise enough, Justice Peters further elaborated
that "commercial actuality" will be satisfied when "purchase or
use of [defendant's] product within the state generates gross
income for the manufacturer, and is not so fortuitous or
unforseeable as to negative the existence of an intent.
' 15

. .

to bring

about this result.
Applying the test to the case at bar, the court found itself
without sufficient facts to determine the issue of foreseeability,
and remanded for further inquiry.
10. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53
Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1.
11. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Long v.
Mishicot Modern Dairy Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967).
12. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220; Fischer Governor Co.
v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, I Cal. Rptr. 1.
13. Gill v. Surgitool, Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967); daSilveira
v. Westphalia Seperator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967).
14. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. at 942, 458 P.2d at 64, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 120.
15. Id.

1970]

COMMENTS

II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION PRIOR

To Buckeye

To fully appreciate Buckeye's impact (or relative lack thereof)
the case must be seen in context of the ongoing development of
judicial attitude toward the due process clause as it limits state

court jurisdiction. The classic case is Pennoyer v. Neff,16 with its
strict requirement of personal service of the defendant within the
state. Pennoyer was reasonably viable while the sheer distances
between states still erected social and commercial barriers. But

with continued advancements in transportation and commerce,
Pennoyer's rule has been gradually relaxed, almost into
extinction. The United States Supreme Court has gone from

of process on transients,
allowing service
18
"consent,"

business,"' 9

17 through

fictions as to

"doing
"presence," ' 0 until finally, in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,2' the Court decided that
the essence of due process requires simply "minimum contacts"
between the defendant and the forum, such that it would be

consistent with "traditional notions of22fair play and substantial
justice" to require him to defend locally.
Unfortunately, what followed was a seemingly endless series
of state and federal cases13 attempting to construe, or clarify what
Justice Stone meant by "minimum contacts . . . fair play and
substantial justice." Those decisions created substitute tests which
the courts have equated with International Shoe's mandate, but
which they find more explicit, and therefore easier to apply. 2 For

the purpose of this analysis, it is both impossible and unnecessary
to distinguish the approach taken by the California courts from
16. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
17. Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819).
18. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926).
19. This was the California statutory language until 1969, when it was finally changed
expressly to adopt the full extent of due process power. The new section reads: "A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the constitution
of this state or of the United States." CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1610 § 3 (Deering 1969).
20. See Justice Black's discussion of all these in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. at 222.
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316; see note 8, supra.
23. A more detailed chronicle of these cases is contained in Annot. 19 A.L.R.3d 13
(1968).
24. The ", agueness" of International Shoe's test has been the rationale of most of
the arguments against it. As will be seen, the writer, supported by eminent authorities,
would prefer instead adjectives like "flexible," or "discretionary." Viewed from this angle,
the quality becomes a major recommendation rather than a drawback.
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that taken by the federal courts. Since California has long held
its jurisdiction statutes25 as co-equal with the full power allowed
by the due process clause,2 6 they are one in the same. 27
The most common gloss put on InternationalShoe is the
three part test used by California.2 8 In addition, scattered through
the cases are a few other criteria. "Presence" although outmoded
and discredited in InternationalShoe, and McGee v. International

Life Insurance Co. is retained in California as an alternative to
the three step test, where the cause of action did not arise from

the activity by which the defendant availed himself to the benefits
and protections of the forum 9 "Expectations of the defendant,"
or "foreseeability" of the likely consequences of his activity
appear as criteria in some federal cases, 30 and, indeed are the
second part of Buckeye's "commercial actuality" test.
These interpretations have all but preempted and obscured

the original rule. No longer, for example, do the California courts
decide a question on the basis of minimum contacts and fair play.
This simple test, calling on the trial judge to exercise his good

judgment and discretion on the facts of each case, has been
unofficially discarded. In its place, while paying lip service to "the
full power of the state consistent with the due process clause,"',

the California courts have saddled themselves with an inviolable,
black and white set of sine qua non's to the exercise of that power.
25.

CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411(2) (Vest 1954).
26. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d I, 1 Cal. Rptr.

I.
27. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. at 938, 458 P.2d at 61, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 117.
28. See notes 10, 11, 12, supra; see also Leflar, Converging Limits of State
JurisdictionalPowers, 9 J. PUB. L. 283 (1960) (for a rewording of the same three-step test);
Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulein Steel Products Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245
(1963) (for Washington's version of the same test). THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03, uses the same mechanical treatment, in the same
three steps, as does the 9th federal circuit in L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins
Industries, Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959).
29. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr.
1; see also Long v. Mishicot Modern Dairy Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr.
432 (1967); and Justice Brandeis' discussion of this in Philadelphia and Reading Railway
Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268 (1917).
30. Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Aftanse v.
Economy Bailer Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
31. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. at 938, 458 P.2d at 61, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 117; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d at 224, 347 P.2d at
3, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
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III.

Buckeye's PRACTICAL EFFECT

The court in Buckeye, on examining California's application
of InternationalShoe, seemed to recognize the problem. But either
the court failed to see it in its entirety, or decided that it was not
the proper time to solve it 2 Resolving to end these hampering
mechanics, all it actually accomplished was to change the test for
satisfying the first part of the California three part test for
satisfying International Shoe's two part test for satisfying due
process. That is, one step has merely been substituted for another
in a process so complicated that it is nearly unintelligiblel
To put Buckeye more simply: The United States
Constitution35 says, "no state shall. . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." As applied to
state court jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the United
States Supreme Court has made minimum contacts, consonant
with fair play and substantial justice, the criterion for determining
due process3 Subsequent cases applying minimum contacts have
held that: (1) the defendant must be involved in some purposeful
activity by which he avails himself of the benefits of the forum,
(2) the cause of action must arise from this purposeful activity,
and (3) the state's interest in providing a local forum must
outweigh the inconvenience to the defendant. If all three are met
then there are minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice.
Further, to determine whether there was purposeful activity, the
California courts until Buc.keye, -have employed a checklist of the
manifestations of this activity.
With this quagmire of unnecessary confusion before it, the
Buckeye court has done virtually nothing. "Commercial
actuality" has merely replaced the checklist approach as the
32. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Adv. Cal. at 943, 458 P.2d at 65, 80
Cal. Rptr. at 121.
33. If this seems confusing, it is partly intentional. After all, the point is that the
process itself is confusing. Read the sentence once more. With each successive reading, it
makes more sense.
34. To illustrate just how confusing the test has become, compare cases cited in note
6, supra, (holding that the power of the California courts over non-residents is as broad
as the due process clause itself, invoking the full extent of power constitutionally available)
with Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d 367, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968). In
Leach, Judge Christian, surveying California's law, notes that while the case at bar may
present no constitutional impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction, C.C.P. § 411(2)
clearly precluded it. The judge's confusion is certainly understandable.
35. Amendment XIV § 1.
36. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310.
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ultimate level of intricacy. Now, instead of running down the list
of indicia of business activity (agents, offices, etc.) the courts will
begin their jurisdictional jigsaw puzzle by determining, (1) whether
the purchase or use of the products generates gross income for the
defendant, and (2) whether such purchase or use is sufficiently
foreseeable as to impute intent to him.

IV. Is THIS TRIP NECESSARY?
When Justice Stone wrote his opinion for the court in
InternationalShoe, he handed the courts of the nation a simple,
easily understood test. It was flexible enough that judges could,
on a case by case basis, use their discretion to determine whether
it would be fair to exercise jurisdiction. The only guideline was the
implicit fair play requirement of due process. The years since then
have seen a considerable departure from Stone's test3
The Buckeye court, concerned with the subsequent obscuring
of this guideline, regarded the checklist as an artificial criterion,
and abandoned it in favor of "commercial actuality." Indeed, this
does seem to be a slightly more straightforward method of settling
the purposeful activity issue. But, should not the court look one
step further? It condemned the checklist as merely going to the
outward manifestations of the true consideration. But the three
step test which it summarily affirmed is just as mechanical and
artificial as was the checklist.
Maintaining the three sine qua non's of jurisdiction denies the
courts the flexibility to adapt to changing times and cases which
was granted them by International Shoe. There is substantial
authority from the United States Supreme Court that it, in fact,
intended the due process test to remain as open and flexible as was
enunciated by Justice Stone. In McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co. 3 1 for example, Justice Black, writing for the
majority, noted that in a continuing process of evolution, the
Court had accepted and then abandoned the concepts of
"consent," "doing business," and "presence" as standards for
measuring the reach of due process. The whole thrust and purpose
of due process is fairness. So, Black seemed to indicate, rather
than define it in terms of artificial fictions, InternationalShoe
37. See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732, 19
A.L.R.3d I (1966) and annotation following.
38. 355 U.S. 220.
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settled on this basic purpose itself.39 In fact, Justice Stone, in
InternationalShoe, addressing himself to the old artificial tests,
seemed to anticipate the new ones. He said;
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical and quantitative. [It] must depend rather on the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure.40
This view finds strong state court support in Phillips v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.41 There, the Arizona Supreme Court
strongly criticized the majority opinion in Hanson v. Denckla for
stressing the requirement that the defendant corporation
purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business
within the forum. 42 In a three pronged attack, the Phillips court
denounced the requirement as: (1) a revitalization of the implied
consent theory disapproved in International Shoe; (2) a reversal
of the trend towards expanding state court jurisdiction, which was
noted and impliedly approved in Hanson; and, (3) an undermining
of the basic idea that each case should be determined on its merits
as to fairness, rather than by strict application of an artificial set
of requirements. Phillips also disapproved the requirement of
foreseeability by the defendant of the consequences of his activity.
The court felt that this may well be a valid consideration, but it,
just like all other requirements, should be limited to the status of
a consideration, rather than being controlling.
This then is the suggestion: Rather than merely exchanging
one requirement for another, Buckeye should have abandoned all
the requirements, as requirements, and re-established "minimum
contacts" and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
39. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. at 222. Even California's
Supreme Court has accepted this as late as 1957. Justice Traynor notes in Atkinson v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 345, 316 P.2d 960, 965, ". . . emphasis is no longer
placed on actual or physical presence but on the bearing that local contacts have to the
question of overall fair play and substantial justice."
40. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
41. Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732.
42. Note that the very requirement which is denounced by Phillips is the subject of
Buckeye's holding. The purpose of "commercial actuality" is to determine whether the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within the

forum.
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justice." It is past time to return to the simplicity of rule and to

the flexibility of application which was originally intended by
InternationalShoe. Certainly the concepts of "purposeful

activity," "availing itself of the forum benefits," "arising from
the contacts," "forum conveniens" and all the others should not
be discarded. They are useful, logical considerations to be weighed

in determining minimum contacts. It is simply urged that they be
used only as considerations, not essential requirements.

As with any legal position, this one will surely attract
criticism. The most foreseeable, and probably the only viable one,
would be that of Professor McBain, who complains that
"minimum contacts" and "fair play" are entirely too vague, and
are utterly incapable of guiding corporations in the conduct of

their activities.13 However, this argument seems to be easily
answered by a perusal of the many other areas of substantive and

procedural law, where the trend is clearly away from intricate
complexity, towards
more basic considerations of fairness and
44
reasonableness.

As further support, there is an indication from some of the
legal scholars that at least to a certain extent, some of the courts

as a matter of practice, ignore the complex criteria they set up.
Currie, in examining the non-resident motorist statutes,4 comes to
the conclusion that judges are not really interested in implied
consent, as they say. What it really boils down to is that, in light
of the activities of the defendant, and the great interest of the state

in providing the forum, it is not unfair to require the motorist to
defend locally. Moore, in his work on federal practice, attempting

to summarize the federal disposition towards personal
43. MeBain, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations:Actions Arising out of Acts
Done Within the Forum, 34 CAL. L. REv. 331 (1946). Professor McBain lumps
InternationalShoe's test into the same vague mass as "consent," "doing business," and
"presence."
44. The examples of these are legion. But a few will suffice here. California has
abolished the complex system of rules as to the liability of owners and occupiers of land
in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The courts
now simply apply a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. Also in California
the historic complexity of grounds and defenses for divorce has been abandoned in favor
of the simple "irreconcilable differences," FAMILY LAW AcT, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4000 et
seq., CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1608 (Deering 1969). There are even indications that tile
multitude of exceptions to the hearsay rule may someday be abandoned in favor of a
blanket consideration of trustworthiness and necessity, Smith, The Hearsay Rule and the
Docket Crisis:The FutileSearchfor Paradise,54 A.B.A.J. 231 (1968).
45. The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illindis,
1963 U. ILL. LAW FORUM at 553.
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jurisdiction, seems to conclude that the courts themselves are not
inflexible with their own seemingly hard and fast rules. In fact,
he finds himself unable to distill the decisions into a rule. He
merely observes that the quality of the contact and its relation to
the cause of action, interplay as major considerations in the
determination." This is certainly a view more closely allied to
"minimum contacts" and "fair play" than is the present
California standard.!7 Professors Erenzweig and Louisell go even
one step further. After a discussion of the directions in state court
jurisdiction, they have suggested that "a nationwide jurisdiction,
limited by 'fair play' to the forum conveniens,4 8 may, with or
without the help of federal legislation, become the final answer."49
V.

CONCLUSION

In response to the ever increasing demands put on the state
court system by the spiralling incidence of interstate commerce
and transportation, and recognizing the need for the judicial
system to be able to adapt to the chameleonic circumstances of
the times, the United States Supreme Court in InternationalShoe
handed down a view of due process which would give the states
the flexibility and discretion they so badly needed. In the years
since International Shoe, the California courts have interpreted,
converted, and perverted the simple test of fairness to the. point
that it is no longer responsive to the times.
The time has come to reform our state court application of
personal jurisdiction, to conform with the "minimum contacts"
and "fair play" standards which the courts claim, but refuse to
follow. The California Supreme Court had the opportunity, in
Buckeye Boiler v. Superior Court to take that step. The
opportunity should have been seized, but it was not.
MICHAEL

D. WELLINGTON

4.25 (2d ed. 1953). Moore notes that: If there
46. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
are substantial contacts, and the cause of action arises from them, the courts will almost
invariably take jurisdiction. If there are substantial contacts but the cause of action does
not arise from them, the courts may take jurisdiction. If there are minimum contacts, but
the cause of action arises from them, the court will usually take jurisdiction. And if there
are minimum contacts and the cause of action does not arise from them, the courts will

seldom take jurisdiction.
47. Several professors are, in their classes, preaching the "fairness" standard. For
example, Prof. Frank Engfelt (University of San Diego School of Law) suggests in his
Conflict of Laws class, that the court's will do "whatever's fair."
48. Erenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power Myth" and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 312 (1956).

49. A.
1968).
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